The Afghan political prognosis remains the same: the future is unclear…

January 20 is quite near, and it will be the starting point of the full-scale UN sanctions against the Taleban regime. The sanctions, in themselves, are not the know-how of the third millenium, yet it is difficult to reduce their practical application, in respect of different states and regimes, to a common denominator. The current level of communications, transport, banking and production technologies does not allow the “stable” segments of the planet to keep aloof from “unstable” ones, even using sophisticated means of protection. The main reason is that today, at the macro-level, all states and regions are the components of a single system. It is only the degree of interdependence of different components that differs. By the example of the situation in Afghanistan, the global correlation becomes apparent in growing heroin prices in the Western European markets. Refugees also reach European capitals, though the current outflow of the Afghans from their country remains incomparable with the potential exodus, if the situation develops in an unfavorable way. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) very painfully reacts to the Taleban’s different “escapades” conducted under the slogans of Islam’s purity. Infringements upon women’s rights and other “exaggerations” by Taleban cause damage to the general image of Islam. The Iranian religious leader, Ali Hamenei announced about this yet in 1996. Teheran is eager to peacefully settle the Afghan problem, yet it does not need any kind of peace. As a large regional power, IRI expects its interests to be met in a certain way. India also anticipates peace in Afghanistan, as instability in the latter catalyzes tension in Kashmir. Yet Delhi, evidently, does not need pro-Pakistani Afghanistan. Subsequently, India sympathizes with Rabbani’s government and supports it. Saudi Arabia, along with Pakistan and UAE, acknowledged the Taleban as the legal power in Afghanistan. In exchange for money, Riyadh influences the Taleban. Of course, there are certain discrepancies between the Taleban and the kingdom (for example, the Taleban coolly treats monarchy), yet the tensions never increased to the point that Saudis were obliged to stop financing. Riyadh would agree with peace, possibly, only if the Taleban absolutely dominated, as the former had invested a lot in the latter. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is politically strongly dependent on the U.S.A. It may so happen that after January 20 Saudi Arabia will have to choose between the support of Taleban and Washington’s sanctions. While voting on the UN Security Council’s resolution # 1333, the Chinese delegation abstained from voting. Yet Beijing does care if Uighur separatists are specifically “trained” in Afghanistan. Moreover, Xinjiang is too close to the “hotbed,” and it can also turn into a similar one itself. It is noteworthy that Turkey supports sanctions against the Taleban, though Ankara sympathizes with Chechen separatists and the Taleban’s friends. On the whole, Turkey supports tendencies to the peaceful settlement. Possibly, in a more quiet political situation, Ankara hopes to gain both economic and energy dividends.